《装卸时间与滞期费》第6版

CHAPTER 3 第3章

Commencement of laytime 装卸时间的起算

CHAPTER 3 第3章

Commencement of laytime

装卸时间的起算

3.459 The Court of Appeal were given a chance to consider this type of provision in Shipping Developments Corporation SA v. V/O Sojuzneftexport (The Delian Spirit). [1] In this case, the Delian Spirit arrived off the port of Tuapse to load a cargo of crude oil, but as, due to congestion, no berth was available, she anchored in the roads and gave notice of readiness. She lay in the roads for five days before a berth became available.

3.459在Shipping Developments Corporation SA v. V/O Sojuzeftexport(The Delian Spirit)案，上诉法院得以有机会对这类条文进行讨论。在该案中，Delian Spirit轮去黑海Tuapse港装原油，由于港口拥挤没有可用的泊位，该轮在港外的锚地拋锚并递交了准备就绪通知书，她等了5天才靠泊。

3.460 In the subsequent arbitration proceedings, the umpire held that on arrival in the roads she was not an Arrived ship, but in the High Court[2] Donaldson J was in no doubt that she was an Arrived ship in the technical sense, a conclusion shared by the Court of Appeal. Despite his decision on this point, Donaldson J held that time ran under the laytime provisions but that the owners were nevertheless also entitled to claim damages for detention during the same period by virtue of a breach of the ‘‘reachable on arrival’’ provision. The Court of Appeal disagreed, preferring the reasoning of Roskill J in The President Brand.[3] Lord Denning put it this way:[4] So it is said the charterers are liable in damages... and are also liable to demurrage after the laytime expired. The judge accepted that submission, but I cannot agree with it. It would be most unjust that the charterers should be made liable twice over. The answer is given by a long line of cases which establish that where the charterers have been guilty of a breach causing delay, they are entitled to apply their laytime so as to diminish or extinguish any claim for the delay, leaving the shipowners to claim for demurrage at the agreed rate for any extra delay over and above the laytime.

The remainder of the court agreed, Fenton Atkinson LJ saying:[5] While in certain circumstances which I do not think it is necessary to attempt to define on the facts of this case you can have an arrival of a ship... before that ship becomes technically an arrived ship for laytime purposes, and therefore the charterer who has failed to provide a berth at the time of such arrival will become liable for damages for detention, once the ship becomes an arrived ship in the technical sense the position is different, and in my judgment the charterer gets the advantage of the laytime provided by the charterparty . . .

3.460在随后的仲裁中，公断人裁定抵达外锚地不能被视为抵达船。但高等法院，Donaldson法官却毫不犹豫地认定说从技术上讲她是抵达船舶。这一结论得到了上诉法院的支持。Donaldson法官还判定：尽管在这一点上，装卸时间是按照装卸时间条款的规定起算，但船东还是有权根据违反‘到达即可靠泊’的规定索赔这一时期的滞期延迟损失。但上诉法院并不认同，倾向于支持Roskill法官在The President Brand案的理由。Denning勋爵是这样说的：如果这样说，承租人应负责损失……还应负责装卸时间届满后的滞期费。尽管高院法官接受这一观点，但我不能同意。要求承租人赔偿两次，这是十分不公平的。已确立的一长串的案例给出的回答是：虽然承租人违约造成延迟，他们仍有权适用他们的装卸时间条款（除外时间）来减少或抵销对延迟的任何索赔，只让船东按照约定的费率来索赔超出装卸时间之外的那部分延迟。

法庭上其余的2名大法官均同意他的看法，Fenton Atkinson大法官说：尽管在某种情况下，对此我并不认为有必要再去加以定义，依据本案的事实，从技术上讲在她成为抵达船之前，为了装卸时间的起算，你可以认定她是抵达船……因此，承租人未能在该轮在这一抵达当时提供泊位，就得对此滞期延迟损失负责。一旦该轮从技术角度上成为抵达船，其地位就不一样了，依我判断，承租人可以得到租船合同所规定的装卸时间的有利条件（除外时间）……

[1] Shipping Developments Corporation SA v. V/O Sojuzneftexport (The Delian Spirit) [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 506 (CA).

[2] The Delian Spirit [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 64.

[3] The Delian Spirit [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 506, at p. 509.

[4] Lord Denning said the long line of cases to which he referred started with Petersen v. Dunn & Co (1895) 1 CC 8 and finished with Roskill J’s decision in The President Brand [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 338.

[5] The Delian Spirit [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 506, at p. 510.